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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the perceived threats from terrorism in six organizations in the travel and 
leisure sector in the UK. These organizations are particularly exposed to such extreme threats. 
This paper examines how managers in organizations deal with uncertainty where probabilities 
are impossible or difficult to define and examines how they face the challenge of interpreting and 
acting upon these interpretations. Theoretically the paper draws upon two lenses: organizational 
resilience and institutional perspectives.  The former assumes managers can act autonomously to 
increase organizational resilience. The latter argues that systemic features of organization are 
more accurate explanations of why managers and organizations fail to spot threats and 
impending disasters.  The data indicate that perceptions of uncertainty and threats from terrorism 
and theories of action differ in and between organizations depending upon factors such as the 
accuracy and completeness of information; previous experience of terrorist events and whether 
or not these threats were prioritized over other uncertainties. Three organizations in the aviation 
industry prioritize threats from terrorism, whilst three organizations in the leisure and travel 
sector do not.  Managers in the aviation industry tend to take a proactive, organizational 
resilience stance toward uncertainty, whilst managers in the other organizations are more 
reactive, or take little action, with systemic features of organization taking precedence over 
decisions and actions.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines how the threats of terrorism are being handled in a range of UK firms in the 
Travel and Leisure Sector (TLS) in the UK in the post 9/11 era.  We examine how managers 
perceive these threats and how they justify their actions in securing defences against possible 
attack. We examine how and why these perceptions and actions vary across the six organizations 
studied. 
 
We argue that the threat of terrorism represents what Meyer (1982) termed an example of 
‘hyperturbulence’, or quantum change to the status quo. Typically, researchers have examined 
such quantum changes in terms of shifting industry boundaries, technological revolutions and 
new forms of organization (Meyer, Gaba and Colwell 2005). These quantum changes are 
associated with high risk.  In this study, we argue that the threat of terrorism represents a similar 
degree of risk which is likely to necessitate profound changes to everyday organization practices. 
To do this, we examine data from six TLS organizations in the UK.    
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We chose the post 9/11 era to conduct this research, since that single event marks what Meyer 
(1982) termed an ‘exogenous jolt’. There have been a number of other such jolts. These include 
the bombing of Bali, Madrid, London, Egypt and Turkey; the hijacking of an outbound flight 
from Moscow airport in 2004 and major disruptions to international flights and travellers caused 
by airlines and airports trying to contain the threat of terrorism. We further argue that following 
these jolts, it would be reasonable to expect some evidence of commensurate management action 
in organizations exposed to such threats (and acts) of terrorism. This is an important question, 
since many organization theorists have argued that, in general, managers will adopt routine and 
institutionalized adjustments to such jolts, rather than embark upon more radical changes 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1988). March (1981) has similarly argued that organizations are likely 
to adopt incremental adjustments and routine changes in the face of both continuous and 
discontinuous changes (jolts encouraging discontinuous change). We will examine whether or 
not this is the case in the organizations we studied. 
 
Uncertainty and risk are no strangers to organization theory. However, the majority of theorists 
advocate adopting strategies to preserve equilibrium and linearity in the face of uncertainties by 
posing uncertainties as a variety of assessable risks (see Meyer, Gaba and Colwell 1985: 456). 
For example, Thompson (1967) argued that above all else, the technical core of an organization 
should be protected from uncertainty by creating boundary-spanning departments which could 
buffer the organization’s transformational or production processes. The heart of the organization 
could be shielded from potentially damaging shocks and buffering could provide stability and 
continuity by helping reduce exposure to threat. Bryan and Joyce (2005) take a similar stance, 
arguing that although the technical core of the organization is now mostly professional staff 
(rather than technical), organizational designs and architectures should similarly protect them 
from unnecessary risks.   
 
Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921) describe risk as a situation when the probabilities describing 
unknown events are calculable, whilst uncertainty obtains when probabilities are unknown, 
either in the absence of prior experience, or because we do not know which probability 
distribution to use from a number of possible options.  In organization theory this is often called 
ambiguity, or decision making under complete ignorance. 
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We argue that the threat of terrorism goes beyond conventional notions of risk, taking 
organizations into the arena of high uncertainty (defining risk is measurable; uncertainty is not), 
although  Beck (1992: 26) has argued that risks have also changed in nature, „they have become 
more global, less readily identifiable, more problematic, less easily managed, and they are more 
anxiety provoking‟. (Beck, 1992: 26), so the line between risk and uncertainty is becoming 
increasingly blurred.  The threat of global terrorism fits with Beck’s perspective. Terrorist related 
uncertainties have parallels with other ‘bolts out of the blue’ such as ‘normal’ accidents (Perrow 
1999, e.g. Bhopal) man-made disasters (Turner 1976, e.g. Columbia) or natural disasters (Lynch 
2004, e.g. South East Asia tsunami, Hurricane Katrina). Following Czinkota et al. (2004: 589) 
we define terrorism as: 
 
The threat or use of violence to attain political or other goals through intimidation 
(threatened or actual) towards organizations and individuals in civil society. 
 
To date, little empirical research has been conducted into how managers deal with uncertainties 
created by the threat (and sometimes the actuality) of terrorist attacks (exceptions include Cornish 
2007; Sullivan-Taylor and Wilson 2007). Czinkota et al. (2005: 583) argue that conceptual and 
empirical research on possible relationships between terrorism and management are missing from 
the literature. We know very little about how managers make decisions about the perceived threat 
of terrorism (Faulkner 2001). This paper attempts to throw some light on these processes. 
 
In particular, we investigate how managers interpret the threat of terrorism and what theories of 
action managers take toward acting upon such uncertainties. Theories of action arise from 
managers mapping their environments and from inferring both causal arguments about assumed 
relationships between events and also formulating what action to take. Finally, we attempt to 
explain why managers perceive and act in the ways they do towards this particular set of 
uncertainties. 
 
Situating the Research Theoretically  
There are at least two broad and contradictory theoretical orientations drawn from organization 
theory which can be applied to this field of study.  These are termed here, the organizational 
resilience approach (which gives primacy to managerial agency) and a more institutionalist 
perspective (which gives primacy to the social structures and embedded processes of organization). 
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Theorists espousing the resilience approach have based much of their work on Weick and 
Sutcliffe’s (2001) notion of high reliability organizations (those which prosper and succeed in 
high-risk industries). Hamel and Valikangas (2003) argue that a highly resilient company has the 
power to prosper no matter what is the nature of the uncertainties it faces. Resilient companies 
meticulously prepare for the worst and establish routines enabling them to improvise rapid 
responses to crises. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue that HROs exhibit mindfulness, meaning a 
combination of high alertness, flexibility, and adaptability which, in turn, lead to increased 
resilience. In summary, HROs are never tricked by their successes, paying detailed attention to 
even small failures instead; they listen to their experts on the front line and not just senior 
managers; they let unexpected circumstances provide solutions; and they embrace complexity and 
anticipate. HROs also think strategically by acting and learning from those actions (rather than 
adopting a grand strategy of first think, then act). As Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue, actions by 
managers can build an organizational capacity for resilience: 
 
 Technical: the ability of managers to ensure that organizational systems 
perform to high levels when subject to extreme stress 
 
 Organizational: the preparedness of managers to make decisions (however 
counter-intuitive these might sound initially) and to take actions to reduce 
disaster vulnerability and impacts 
 
 Resourcefulness: the capacity of managers to identify potential problems, 
establish priorities and mobilize resources to avoid damage or disruption 
 
 Rapidity: the capacity of managers to make decisions on threats (e.g. from 
terrorism) without undue delay. 
 
The ‘resilience’ perspective has gained ground in the last few years as a solution to organizations 
facing high levels of threat in all aspects of their operating environment.   In the military and 
security sectors, building and maintaining resilience has become a by-word for significantly 
increased safety (see Cornish 2007). These writers emphasize the need for organizations to develop 
the ability to bounce back and self-right following a crisis. An important aspect concerns the 
impact of terrorist threats on people individually (as well as the organization itself) necessitating a 
shift from a reactive to a proactive stance toward crisis management and disaster recovery. 
Scenario planning and worst-case scenarios are part of this approach. Anticipation is key (Wensley 
2003). The preparedness of an organization (via its managers) to assess and face future threats is 
crucial. Organizations which are not resilient are likely to be vulnerable, exposed and, perhaps, 
complacent toward the threats and hazards they face (Omand 2006).   
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This essentially resource-based view has extended beyond security and has permeated 
management thinking toward uncertainty, especially in the area of strategic management. Hamel 
and Valikangas (2003), for example, discuss the ‘threat’ of existing business models being 
considered (erroneously) immortal and extend the resilience argument to include organizational 
strategy more generally, using many of the same concepts developed in the military and security-
related texts (such as anticipating extreme events through worst-case scenarios; avoiding nostalgia 
and arrogance traps such as assuming an organization will always be the market leader). In line 
with much popular management literature, Hamel and Valikangas (2003) view such concepts as 
organizational learning, experimentation and information technology as effective counter-terrorist 
and resilience building blocks. Resilience has permeated other areas such as trust (Bhide and  
Stevenson, 1992), leadership (Fiedler and Garcia, 1987)  and the personal qualities of employees 
(Furnham, 1992). Overall, in all of these approaches lies an abiding belief in the voluntaristic 
abilities and facilities of managerial agency. That managers can build resilient organizations is the 
leitmotiv of many articles in these areas. The agency debate has also permeated the field of 
Sociology in examining risk. Cerulo (2007: 5), for example, argues that planning for worst-case 
scenarios can be very helpful in building resilience, adding that the majority of individual 
managers tend to adopt an overly optimistic view of risk, a concept she terms ‘positive asymmetry’ 
(Cerulo 2007: 17). 
   
Running counter to the above arguments lies a group of more deterministic, more organizational-
institutionalist perspectives and arguments (Gephart, 2004), which demote the importance and 
influence of individual agency in favour of more exogenous explanations of managerial action (or 
inaction).  
 
Perrow (1984) analyzed a range of disasters including nuclear incidents, and accidents in 
petrochemical plants and organizations ranging from space flight to genetic engineering. 
Subsequent disasters included Chernobyl, Bhopal, and the Challenger explosion.  Reviewing these 
disasters, Starbuck and Farjoun (2005) concluded that the sources of disasters were more 
organizational in origin than they were a function of managerial action. Both the Challenger and 
the Columbia Space Shuttle ‘accidents’ arose from the:  
„innate, essential, intrinsic, and real nature of NASA‟s organizational system: 
a complex constellation of interacting factors that included NASA‟s 
political/economic environment, organization structure, and layered cultures 
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that affected how people making technical decisions defined and redefined 
risk‟ 
 (Vaughan 2005:85).   
In other words, the roots of these failures were organizational in nature. Several authors 
researching the tourist industry report similar findings of organizationally based failures including 
a general lack of innovation and an over-reliance on old and familiar ways in the face of these 
specific risks (Faulkner 2001; Tarlow and Santana 2002). Czinkota et al. (2005) argued that in „the 
USA the majority of organizations are unprepared to meet such risks and that complacency has 
set in‟ (Czinkota et al. 2005: 588).  
 
This unpreparedness emphasizes institutionally bound explanations (such as an over-reliance on 
technical or administrative systems to provide an accurate guide to action). For example, Hedberg 
(1981) and Weick (1995) infer that exposure to new, risky situations increases uncertainty and 
forces managers to seek new theories of action. However, as Weick (1995) observes, theories of 
action may simply involve managers looking to the past, making sense of new threats in much the 
same ways as they made sense of old and more familiar threats, thereby treating decisions on 
terrorism threat in much the same ways as they handle other decisions. The norms and values of 
decision making in organizations (well understood and familiar organizationally institutionalized 
processes) take priority of explanation over individual action.   
 
One of the most recent authors to embrace this systemic view specifically in the field of threats 
from terrorism is Taleb (2007). He argues that individuals are good at retrospectively ‘predicting’ 
random events that happened in the past, but find looking forward impossible. Largely this is 
because, on the basis of limited experience (these managers are unlikely to have experienced a 
terrorist attack directly) they conclude that such attacks are highly improbable (they won’t happen 
to their organization). Taleb argues that organizational history reveals much about the ways in 
which the construction of elegant chains of reasoning is a feature of the historical narrative, 
presenting neatness and order (when there was little) and causation (when events may have been 
random). From this perspective, history (and by implication organizational stories) as well as 
management actions become institutionalized. Taleb (2007: 15) calls this ‘retrospective distortion’.  
 
From this perspective, features of the institution (its history, for example) shape both managerial 
perception and action.   Although managers may have to refine theories of action as new situations 
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are encountered (Hedberg 1981; Laqueur 1999), such change and refinement is likely to be slow 
and incremental (Turner 1976; Weick 1995) because of institutional inertia. Turner (1976) argues 
that organizations adopt strong rigidities in their institutional beliefs that prevent them from 
handling risks from disasters effectively and from this institutional perspective the same may be 
argued about organizational responses to terrorism. Such arguments have been well rehearsed 
elsewhere in organization theory (see, for example, Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; March and Olsen 
1984; Powell and Di Maggio 1991; Scott 2001) but they have resonance with the subject of this 
paper. 
 
The institutional perspective gives primacy to the roles of structures, rules, norms, and routines, as 
they become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviours in organizations. As Scott 
(2001: 48) argues: 
 
 “[organizations] are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and 
meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, 
including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts”. 
 
This is precisely Taleb’s (2007) argument. Embedded assumptions represent a potentially 
dangerous asymmetry of both perception and response (it won’t happen to us; we need not take 
any actions against the threat). So how does this institutional perspective impact upon 
understanding and interpreting how managers act under the threat of terrorism? First, it adopts a 
sceptical position toward viewing managers as rational individual actors, arguing instead that 
managers’ perceptions and actions will inevitably be shaped by institutional variables. Secondly, it 
argues that relatively rare events (such as the act of terrorism) rarely occur within a normal 
distribution of probability. Yet organizations strive in the design of their structures and processes 
toward rationality in assuming that threats can be interpreted within the realm of calculable odds 
which are, hence, likely to occur within a normal distribution (see Taleb 2007). These institutional 
pressures force managers to adopt what Taleb (2007: 25) calls the ‘ludic fallacy’ (assuming that all 
odds are calculable). From this perspective, the odds of a terrorist attack are likely to be dealt with 
using the same (normal distribution) criteria which might be applied to, say, decisions to invest or 
to change key suppliers. 
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Whilst theoretically diverse, the resilience and institutional perspectives share a common feature, 
that of managerial action. If research can delineate what ‘frames of reference’ managers embrace 
in guiding their actions or framing their decisions on the threat of terrorism, it should be able to 
reveal the extent to which such actions and framing are more a function of managerial actions to 
build organizational resilience, or are more institutionally bounded (Orlikowski and Gash 1994). 
That is a central purpose of this paper. 
  
 
Sample 
 
All six organizations are in the travel and leisure sector (TLS). Such organizations are relatively 
highly exposed to threats from terrorist threats and actions. As Czinkota, et al (2005) observe, 
terrorism has directly affected the fortunes of organizations in this sector and, as Mayntz (2004) 
explains, terrorism is a relatively new threat and such organizations are often a primary target for 
terrorist threats. Other authors have also shown how exposed the TLS is to terrorism (see, for 
example, Bentley and Page 2001; Callander and Page 2003; Greenaway 1996). All the sample 
organizations are based in the UK and operate internationally (see Table I for a summary of the 
sample). 
 
Gaining quality access to organizations is difficult on most occasions, but is especially so when the 
topic is often perceived by informants to be how well (or how badly) managers cope with the 
threat of terrorism.  There was reluctance amongst many organizations to allow access for this 
study. The six organizations studied here therefore represent those which would allow quality 
access. We were helped in gaining access to the first organization by its CEO being an alumnus of 
the University. Access to further organizations was gained by a ‘rolling’ process whereby 
organizations granting access were asked to recommend others, so as to enable us to compare our 
findings across different TLS firms. As an unintended consequence, this gave us a range of 
organizations linked along a supply chain which involves attracting, organizing and transporting 
visitors into a country, processing and transporting them internally to the city and venue of their 
final destination. This may be a holiday or an event such as the Chelsea Flower Show, an 
exhibition or a sporting event such as Wimbledon Tennis or the 2012 Olympics. The sample for 
this research therefore comprises organizations interlinked within what is termed the UK’s ‘visitor 
economy’. Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) advocate that TLS organisations within the visitor 
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economy can and should play an active role in the co-ordination of tourism stakeholders in 
addressing the threat of terrorism. 
  
A further reason for choosing to study organizations in this sector is that they have recently 
become the focus of regulation specifically concerned with the threat of terrorism. For example, 
the UK Government’s Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires private sector organizations to have 
inter-organizational emergency response and recovery plans and VisitBritain (previously UK 
Tourism and the British Tourism Authority) requires organizations in the travel and leisure sector 
to formalize their business continuity plans and to be clear about their responses to the threat or act 
of a terrorist attack. 
 
A theoretical sampling framework was used since we picked a sector which is particularly exposed 
to terrorism and the managers we interviewed were those who might be expected to be responsible 
for their organization’s responses and actions toward the threat of terrorism.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Method 
Qualitative research has previously been conducted to investigate infrequent organizational events, 
such as accidents and disasters. Studies by Gephart (1984 and 1988b), Meyer (1982), Roberts 
(1990), and Vaughan (1990), for example, have produced case descriptions of disasters and 
responses to environmental jolts. These studies have also provided insights that have established 
organizational disasters as important topics for management research. To further develop this area, 
Gephart (1993: 1467) argued that „disaster studies and management research could benefit from a 
more extensive development and systematic, exhaustive analyses of comprehensive qualitative data 
bases‟. This paper provides qualitative research that helps to address this call.  This research was 
an exploratory examination of how managers perceive and act upon uncertainty in the context of 
terrorist threats.  Hence, a qualitative, semi-grounded and inductive approach was adopted (Van 
Maanen 1983; Glaser and Strauss 1967: 3).  
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All data were collected using in-depth interviews with key informants in each organization. All 
discussions and interviews were digitally recorded. Multiple informants were drawn from the 
sample organizations (ranging from a minimum of three to a maximum of five per organization). 
All informants were closely involved in both assessing and in taking strategic decisions about 
threats facing their organization and this was a criterion for their selection as key informants. 
Interviews typically lasted two hours and in some cases substantially longer (where the researchers 
were able to set up group discussions with key informants which often lasted up to half a day). 
Three organizations were the site for group discussions (Catering Supplier; Airport; Tour 
Company). Typically, informants would bring along two or three other managers to the group 
discussions to comment and give more detailed information. These discussions were in addition to 
the in-depth interviews carried out with individual informants. It was not possible to organize these 
group discussions in every case, but this data collection method was used where it was possible to 
get a small group of around six people together at the same time for half a day. Appendix A gives 
examples of questions and prompts used during interviews and group discussions.  
 
Data collection spanned a nine-month period between January and September 2004.  Table II 
summarises informants, group discussions and organizations. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
From each of the six participating organizations, up to five representatives were involved in 
discussions, either in individual interviews or group meetings. All meetings were arranged via the 
key contact who ensured that staff with relevant knowledge regarding the organization’s responses 
to the threat or act of terrorism were involved. In addition, in each organization the CEO or MD 
was interviewed where practical, as were the operational level managers such as those who 
managed security in the specific operations such as venues and airports, as well as those involved 
in managing external public relations, research and personnel. All informants were involved in 
strategic and operational level decisions regarding the organization’s safety and security. By 
including both the strategic and operational level managers in the sample, the data represented a 
wide overview of threat within each organization.  
 
Once data had been collected and interviews transcribed, the authors looked for patterns, themes 
and the overall stories revealed in the data. Following Pentland (1999) and Langley (1999), we 
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examined the transcripts for focal actors, voices, actions, choices, and events that were woven into 
an empirically based story about how and why something happened. In this way, we could 
construct a number of stories about and attitudes toward perceived threats from terrorism. This was 
carried out manually with each of the two authors independently identifying themes. This coding 
procedure revealed three major themes in perception and four major themes of action, each of 
which both authors had independently identified. Like Ball and Wilson’s (2000) study of computer 
based monitoring, we use these themes as the basis for discussion in this paper. The three themes 
of perception are ‘threats can be measured and prioritized’, ‘regulation will take care of the threat’, 
and ‘threat from terrorism is a top priority’. The four major themes of action are ‘work with other 
organizations in the supply chain’, ‘rely on other organizations’, ‘rely on regulation and 
information’, and ‘business as usual comes first’. 
 
As Pentland (1999) and Langley (1999) point out, stories and description are one thing, validity is 
another. In order to ensure validity, we involved all six organizations in feedback sessions. These 
took the form of the authors organizing two events in London to which representatives from all six 
organizations were invited. It proved impossible to get dates to visit each organization separately, 
so a joint event seemed a workable alternative. The events were workshops focused on the ‘visitor 
economy’ and the results from the current paper were disseminated. Each organization had at least 
two representatives at the workshops. In neither workshop were factual changes to the stories and 
descriptions requested. Our interpretations were viewed as well-crafted and have formed the basis 
for internal discussions in each of the six organizations. A follow-up study is planned to ascertain 
what changes (if any) have resulted from more current terrorist attacks (such as 7/7 in London) and 
from our feedback. 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Threat can be Measured and Prioritized 
Without exception, managers assumed threat was measurable and assessable through the 
probabilities of normal distribution, rather than being viewed as an immeasurable uncertainty.  
Managers assess the threat of terrorism in terms of the amount, severity and nature of losses which 
might occur and this allows them to assign priority (or not) to the threat. For example, managers in 
the Convention Centre perceived many other threats to be of a greater threat to them than 
terrorism. Such priorities were calculated on the basis of prediction of what would normally 
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happen (Cerulo 2007). Priorities revolved around the content and type of work commissioned and 
presented. 
„„„risks” are associated with being controversial - with the type of work profiled  - the riskier 
it becomes depends on how the patrons will interpret it‟ (Programme Manager).  
„Programming is high risk. I mean you can still find an audience for it, you still might have a 
sold out house for something that‟s very extreme, - but as an arts organization your remit is 
to broaden the art form, not just keep with the status quo‟ (Events Manager). 
They also perceived other threats to be important, singling out the latest foot and mouth epidemic 
in the UK as an example. Risk was primarily perceived as the flow of tourists into the country and 
region and the related fall in demand for conferences and events.  
„… if you think about the effect of foot and mouth or some sort of other big disaster - there‟s 
more risk than just terrorism. Obviously a terrorist threat has an impact, but to a certain 
extent you do what you can do and then you just have to get on with it‟ (General Manager).   
„Foot and mouth wasn‟t that long ago, it destroyed tourism and nearly all this business. This 
has a bigger effect on conference volumes than terrorism‟ (Sales and Marketing Manager). 
 
The Arts and Entertainment Centre informants also did not ascribe priority to threat from terrorism 
using an analysis which relied squarely on what had happened in the past, using black humour to 
paint the retrospective picture (Weick 1995).   
 „The IRA had a bomb go off here many years ago, which was almost a joke. I think he blew 
himself up by mistake. It‟s one of these stories that become part of the mythology of the place 
“oh yes well the IRA tried to blow it up but that wasn‟t very successful and they were 
obviously in the wrong place anyway, they were trying to find the Parliament and found 
themselves on the wrong side of the River”‟ (CEO).  
 
The ‘organizational memory’ (Weick 1995) had already been formed by this semi-humorous 
event.  Even recent terrorist actions, such as 9/11, were perceived as being scalable in nature. The 
centre of business simply shifted location. 
„There is no question re the balance between New York and London, - the cultural centre of 
the world has shifted perceptively since 9/11 to London. New York is like the rest of America, 
it appears to be suffering substantially from the idea that it is not an easy place to go any 
more‟ (Marketing Manager). 
 
For the Tour Operator, the perception of threats from terrorism revolved around the impact it had 
on destination choice by customers. 
 
„People are saying - I‟m safest anywhere - it doesn‟t matter where I go, because it can 
actually happen anywhere, and it‟ll never happen to me, - so people are willing to travel, and 
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that‟s the reason that people still travel even though there is this huge terrorist potential to 
hit somewhere‟ (Sales Manager).  
 
 
 
Regulation Will Take Care of the Threat 
 
The three organizations in the aviation sector rely on regulation as both a signalling device (of 
potential dangers from terrorism) and as a form of industry standard.  
 
„It‟s the airline‟s own regulatory and compliance authorities who have got to become much 
tighter, and that‟s a big issue for a lot of the airlines because they‟re not set up for it; they‟re 
set up to speed up turnaround but they‟re not set up so well. That is a big issue at the moment 
for the Department of Transport, everybody looking at how do you manage the turnaround to 
both be streamlined, but also totally secure‟ (Security Manager). 
 
Of the regulators, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) figures large in the sector as standard 
setters. 
„The CAA will not allow British aircraft to fly into airports that don‟t have the appropriate 
regulations in place.  Which is why, for example, British Airways does not fly into Baghdad 
at all; one of the reasons is because Baghdad International Airport does not have IKO 
standard.  We are not talking about the risk of scud missiles but the airport itself in terms of 
how security is handled at the airport.  It has to meet certain guidelines in terms of the sort of 
national guidelines and probably federal aviation, some federal aviation authority 
guidelines. It doesn‟t currently meet IKO standards‟ (CEO, Airport). 
 
Externally imposed regulations were often interpreted to emphasize their economic consequences 
rather than focus on threats from terrorism. Regulations were argued to constrain the airline, 
because they threatened their low-cost niche in the industry. They could be regulated out of 
business. 
 
„There‟s a temptation with EU control and EU law, expanding its influence more and more, 
that they start to over-regulate potentially the consumer situation or over-regulate the 
industry and actually eliminate consumer choice rather than increasing it as we go forward.  
All that leads to is just everybody having to converge what they‟re offering in terms of a 
product.  So you start to eliminate consumer choice, whereas at the moment somebody pays 
peanuts and they don‟t expect to get with that an insurance policy of knowing they‟ll be put 
up in a hotel or a free meal and the choice is theirs‟ (Regulatory Affairs Manager). 
 
 
Threat from Terrorism is a Top Priority to Managers 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, managers in the aviation sector ascribe priority to perceiving greater 
threat from terrorism than from regulation, because their perceptions are of events which can have 
devastating effects on their business (as well as their passengers). For example, organizations 
supplying food to airlines recognize that introducing poison or a bomb on board an aeroplane via 
the supplied cabin food is more likely to happen in terms of probability than a terrorist getting on 
board as a passenger. It is simpler to infiltrate the food preparation areas than the aeroplane itself.   
 
A common theme overall, however, is that mangers in all six organizations perceive threat based 
largely on probabilities and normal distributions (both of occurrence and of how devastating to the 
business any outcome would be). The amount and severity of likely losses shape and focus 
managers’ perceptions of threat, much along the lines of a standard model of financial risk (Hertz 
and Thomas 1983). Such a perspective, of course, falls squarely under the resilience paradigm, 
assuming both a high degree of managerial agency and of the ability of managers to plot and 
predict risks along different forms of probability distributions.    
 
Threat Management in Action 
Work With Others in the Supply Chain 
Organizations which supply the aviation sector consumables such as catering have traditionally 
adhered to strict quality standards and threat audit processes to try to ensure consistent standards in 
product delivery both domestically and internationally. Standard risk management practices 
already exist: 
 
„Our reputation relies upon not poisoning passengers. So the whole training, the 
compliance regulation, all the controls we put in to ensure total food hygiene and sort 
of batch traceability goes all the way through our business, because we are in a very 
high risk catering environment with the airlines‟ (Director of Catering Operations). 
 
Suppliers work closely with their clients to ensure that their threat management processes are 
robust. Some client organizations have traditionally taken the initiative and insisted their suppliers 
comply with standards set by themselves: 
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„I think BA was in the vanguard of this because the security requirements on us as a caterer 
were hugely ahead of what the industry standards were, industry standards regulated by the 
Department for Transport‟ (Quality Assurance Manager). 
 
Airlines in particular, have historically worked with their suppliers to develop initiatives to ensure 
that the security of the supplier and, therefore, the airline is secured: 
 
„Back in 1999, when we signed a contract with BA, we had BA security work with us through 
a whole programme. We made big investments in exterior perimetering of each site, then you 
actually have positive access into the building for all suppliers, staff and contractors coming 
in. To ensure we have a completely secure environment, there has to be positive access to get 
in to one of our kitchens. Everybody has to wear name badge, we give £25 to any of our staff 
who challenges anybody who is in there without proper badging, to create a sealed 
environment‟ (Security Manager). 
 
Airlines such as British Airways not only secure the site, but due to the variety of different items 
which need to be loaded onto each 747 leaving Heathrow, for example, also ensure that final 
checks are conducted. Informants also commented on the increased emphasis on security 
management since September 11
th
 (9/11). The impact of international terrorism meant that 
suppliers to the aviation sector had to further tighten their threat management processes in order to 
respond to increased security concerns, including the fear of further terrorist attacks: 
 
„What has come very much to the fore since September 11th is the whole airport security, so 
the whole issue of getting a bomb onboard an aircraft; it has always been seen that catering 
would be the easiest area for a bomber to actually get a bomb onboard an aircraft‟ (Security 
Manager). 
 
 „Some of the airlines actually have their own staff in our kitchen doing security during the 
day, especially the American airlines‟ (Quality Supervisor). 
 
Department of Transport representatives visited unannounced to gain access to the kitchens, to try 
to find loopholes:  
 
‘In two years, we‟ve had two incidents out of probably 50 or 60 where they‟ve actually got 
access to them, but they‟ve never got through into the production area‟ (Security Manager). 
 
Informants distinguished between the levels of threat associated with servicing long-haul charter 
and scheduled airlines from those associated with the low-cost carriers. 
 
„The low cost carriers are the simplest, because there‟s no service on board, once we load in 
the morning, it‟s loaded for the day. We often top up with sandwiches and water, but that just 
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involves one person. They don‟t have cabin cleaning, because their staff do all the cleaning. 
They chuck out the rubbish; they don‟t have rubbish contractors. They have optimised the 
model to avoid people coming on at a cost, hence they can facilitate this rapid turnaround 
philosophy. The simplicity of their economic model also works from a security point of view‟ 
(Catering Load Manager).   
 
An international code relating to airport security practices was regulated by the International Civil 
Aviation Authority Security (IKO). This body was charged with issuing guidelines and regulations 
that each national Civil Aviation Authority would enforce. Every airport has to be inspected by 
IKO every two years and airlines will not fly to them unless they are audited. Informants explained 
the national CAA’s role in determining which airports national airlines were allowed to operate. 
Nevertheless, security professionals in the industry recognized that even this degree of investment, 
will never render security ‘foolproof’: 
 
„Here in the UK, Heathrow Airport has had numerous incidents of robberies and the press 
attempts to infiltrate security successfully, which they‟ve done successfully.  So there‟s no 
such thing as perfect security, but one of the things which an airline like British Airways (BA) 
would do is to layer the security so there‟s lots of measures which are being used along the 
way before you actually get on the aircraft up until the point even before the aircraft takes 
off. These kind of layering of security suggests that they have a reasonable angle on how to 
manage security within the kind of British domestic environment but the difficulty is when 
you go abroad‟ (GM Operations). 
 
„Layering means customer profiling and use of CCTV in and around the airport.  For 
example, the way people respond to the questions “did you pack your own bag?” is useful in 
risk reduction?   It is not so much the answer people give, but their body language.  This 
singles them out as being deserving of extra attention, so that as you then pass through all 
the other parts of the security chain towards actually boarding the aircraft, there are a 
number of opportunities to identify people as being suspicious‟ (MD Airport).  
 
BA was considered in the UK to be at the cutting edge in this area, because it had always 
demanded that adequate measures were in place in any airport it flew into. This high standard was 
seen as a common characteristic of other major flag carriers.  
Rely on Other Organizations to Reduce Threat 
Airlines operating from the international airport in our sample included both low-cost carriers and 
scheduled airlines. Low-cost airlines have seemingly invested the minimum resources into security 
management, relying entirely upon airport infrastructure and processes to ensure that security is 
managed appropriately.  
„We have done extensive work after September 11th with Airtours and Thomson Airtours.  It 
became apparent that they had no infrastructure at all, in terms of security.  The margins 
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that they run are so slender that anything above and beyond  the most basic getting bums on 
seats and getting loads of people out to holidays and turning them round again, was just 
beyond anything which they could even comprehend because they would just lose money‟    
(Airport Security General Manager).  
Informants felt that this raised some questions about other low-cost carriers. Although this was one 
of the most regulated sectors in terms of security, airport management expected a baseline 
standard, the regulatory standard would be followed, which would in turn force airlines to 
conform. However, there were concerns about ‘grey areas’ which centred around situations when 
assessable threats became uncertainties: 
 
„I think the grey area comes around the sort of charter, as I mentioned charter companies 
who conform to the letter of the regulation on the aircraft, but it‟s all the other stuff around it 
that they perhaps don‟t quite meet the standards on.  You can‟t imagine the likes of EasyJet 
running sophisticated passenger profiling, for example‟ (Security GM). 
 
Managers in the airline company were concerned with minimizing disruption for the customer in 
their risk management practices.  
„You take the example of security, there are processes devised which we tourists have to jump 
through these various hoops, which we actually now totally accept and actually we like, but 
we need to make sure that they are as customer focused as they are security focused, so we 
try and match process requirement with customer requirement.  There are points where 
you‟d have to say well we need to do this for the sake of security, and public will tolerate 
that, but there‟s ways it can be done.  For example, a silly thing, immigration processes at 
the airport, I find that they‟re the darkest, dreariest po-faced approach, and they absolutely 
have a fantastic job to do, but there is no harm in a good morning.  They can be just as 
efficient and just as ruthless.  You know they‟re the first point of contact for people arriving 
in this country‟ (Marketing Manager). 
 
The airline carries nearly 5 million passengers annually. Due to tight margins in this low-cost 
business, the airline tried to reduce its airport security management costs by relying entirely on 
local airports to manage their security procedures rigorously. The airline also reduced its exposure 
to threat by not providing a full catering service in-flight, thereby reducing the likelihood of food 
hygiene problems or any catering related security breaches. 
 
Rely on Regulation and Information 
 
The airline relied upon regulators to help risk management. Informants argued that regulation is 
essential for maintaining minimum standards of health, safety, fire precautions, and a range of 
related factors. Airline management were concerned, however, at how regulatory policy was 
 22 
deployed internationally and the potential impact this could have on their operations. Regulatory 
policy is not standardized internationally:  
 
„A lot of the policy that‟s come in, particularly in the EU side, is great on paper, but actually 
when you look at the amount that‟s been enacted, or not, frankly on something like the 
French environment, and their whole regulatory system, it‟s just, absolutely rubbish.  
Nobody‟s abiding by that‟ (External Relations Manager).   
 
„We would welcome the industry regulators to be far more educated about demand, the 
patterns and where demand is going when they are making regulations.  It‟s so disconnected 
at the moment, you‟d think they‟d never even flown on an airline or taken a holiday, in terms 
of their level of understanding across the industry‟ (Business Development Manager). 
 
UK-based international tour operators rely upon British government travel information to 
particular overseas destinations to determine whether or not to continue to service particular 
destinations. The Home Office travel advisory service, therefore, has a significant influence on 
travel to specific destinations, directly affecting the viability and success of some key tour 
locations: 
 
 „Caribbean Tourism has suffered at the hands of the Foreign Office travel advice. The 
impact of the travel advisory is I think very significant, but there has been debate about the 
impact on it.  It was reported that on a Caribbean Island, Al-Qaeda had a cell there.  The 
fact it was a Muslim group, with a local leader who expressed sympathy for Osama, ended in 
a shoot out. MI5 compiled reports, and seized on this and raised the ratings, so the cruise 
ships stopped visiting and snorkelling around this specific port. This really put the wind up 
all the other little Caribbean islands, maybe something like that can happen to us?  It was 
going on at the time of the Bali attacks when there was so much scrutiny of travel advisories‟ 
(Marketing Manager). 
 
When a destination is deemed to be too risky, tour operators may cease to operate there. This poses 
problems, however, since risk assessments need to be conducted to determine when it is safe to 
return to that particular destination. Part of this assessment process requires a determination of 
consumer reaction: 
„It must be just over 18 months ago when there was a threat to British aircraft flying into 
Kenya, that they would be shot out of the sky with a missile attack.  So we stopped flying, 
everyone stopped flying and 18 months on and we haven‟t got our charters back in there.  It 
was very profitable, however, this will damage Kenya for a long time, because it‟s faraway, 
it‟s an unknown, people don‟t feel safe in the first place, and when something that happens, 
you can cancel it, you can kill it. It‟s the worst thing that could possibly happen if  a aircraft 
was shot out of the sky.  That‟s worse than a bomb going off in a hotel, much worse. An 
aircraft being shot out of the sky is the most terrifying thing, whereas if they had a bomb in 
the one place, people believe it‟ll never happen to me‟ (GM Operations). 
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Informants explained that they relied upon official Foreign Office (FCO) advice to inform 
decisions. They explained that the nature of risk management involved in running a tour operation 
was to try to manage everything in an integrated manner: 
 
„We have to be aware of all the different pieces (i.e.; hotels, airlines, coaches), every bit that 
everybody else is doing to be able to compete with them all, because we compete with 
everybody. That‟s the challenge for us; it‟s the ultimate risk model. We are dealing with a 
high turnover, low margin type risk profile. It‟s not just about aircraft and putting seats on 
an airline, which is pretty straightforward actually in terms of risk and in terms of 
passengers journey management, -but we have to guarantee a combination, which means we 
have to pay for those beds whether they are filled or not‟  (Yield Manager).  
 
In response to specific threats regarding potential terrorist attacks on tourists in specific areas, tour 
operators had noticed changes in consumer behaviours. Travellers reacted to various terrorist 
attacks and threats in different ways. Some consumers immediately altered their leisure plans 
whilst others became fatalistic about being directly affected by such an attack: 
 
„The amazing thing about terrorism is that it used to be that if a bomb went off somewhere, 
then people would jump somewhere else. Last year for instance, Spain had a boom year.  
Since we had a war over in the East, which meant that people were reluctant to go to Cyprus 
or even though Tunisia, - they all piled into Spain. So that was a bumper year for them.  
This year the Euro is going against them, and now more people feel the war is ended, - but 
we still have terrorist attacks, which really can happen anywhere. Okay, admittedly no one‟s 
going to go to Iraq for their holidays for quite some time, -but they are going to Egypt in 
bigger numbers than ever before, which is pretty close. And as we‟ve seen [terrorist attacks] 
in Madrid, you could have it in an Eastern Mediterranean country, or in the UK.   
 
Tour operators’ informants emphasized that they were frustrated at the quality of the information 
provided. One of the criticisms regarding FCO travel advice was that it either tended to be too 
general or too focused on the backpacker tourist as opposed to the business traveller or, indeed, on 
companies that have operations in a particular country. Hence: 
„There are a lot of steps that have been taken within the Foreign Office to take into account 
the criticism which they encountered from Bali where they didn‟t get to say enough. Also, in 
the India/Pakistan stand-off (the FCO warning that everybody should leave India and 
Pakistan because there was going to be a major confrontation) which was taken extremely 
seriously. It turned out to be incorrect, although it was believed that there was specific 
intelligence behind that, but it turned out not to really pan out the way that it was suggested 
and it could have cost businesses very dearly. There is still massive anger amongst many 
heads of security about that sort of advice, - where they probably said too much and 
everyone evacuated. So now they have realised they needed to focus this stuff more towards 
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business needs rather than to make it so general that it‟s almost worthless‟ (Communications 
Manager). 
Managers also questioned the way ‘intelligence’ was converted into operational level briefings.  
One manager observed how British Airways and Air France were forced to cancel many planes 
travelling into the USA based upon American intelligence, causing considerable disruption to the 
airlines and their passengers:   
„We saw that it got to the point that the airlines actually started to get a bit annoyed with the 
Americans, well pilots certainly did with the American intelligence, because it was a question 
of where‟s this coming from and is it really a problem?‟ (Security Manager).   
 
 
Business as Usual Comes First 
In the arts and entertainment organizations maintaining business as usual (rather than prioritizing 
terrorism) was viewed as key, although there was some evidence of putting practices in place to 
counter terrorism in recent months. Typically, informants would argue that they were ‘used to’ 
high risks. For example, many venues in the UK have been geared towards managing security for 
high-profile visitors such as the Queen, or for high-risk performers such as Israeli dance 
companies. Paradoxically, since high-profile visitors were the norm, the management of risk and 
security was considered by many informants to be a relatively routine matter. 
‘You do what you can do and then you get on with it.  I mean in a way that‟s what we‟ve 
always done. London and England‟s had a history of problems, people just get on with it. I 
think in America you get such a huge reaction the first time something like that ever happens, 
and then you get reactionary policies and strategies  put in place‟ (Security Manager). 
Entertainment venue managers recognized that their centrally located centres may be the target of 
international terrorists wanting to make high-impact statements.  
„If you‟re an icon in that case, they would want to blow up it up because it actually makes a 
major international statement like the World Trade Centre. Some have had to invest a huge 
amount of money in recent times in  security infrastructure… you can‟t drive cars in and you 
can‟t do all sorts of things now that you could have before 9/11, - who would have actually 
thought about them as issues before 9/11?‟  (Front of House Manager). 
 
However, implementing new practices seemed problematic since the reaction to a perceived threat 
largely relied on the judgement of the manager on the day:  
„Even running this place now has changed, our whole business is predicated on accessibility 
from 10 o‟clock in the morning until 12 o‟clock at night and it‟s very different. There are 
three million people who visit the buildings and the facilities just during the day and a 
million who buy tickets at night. The issue is how can do you make a judgement that says, 
you know, do I shut the building down, do I move away from what the nature of my business 
is on the chance that out of all the buildings in all the world, this is the one they‟re going to 
 25 
come to? So you are actually looking at risks but then having to make judgements which are 
almost impossible to actually to determine‟ (Security Manager). 
 
As public building managers, they were seeking to learn from other incidents involving large 
numbers of the public in order to consider how to manage possible terrorist attacks: 
„Regarding blowing people up at the Olympics or on the Madrid train echoes one of my 
nightmares. Running halls with lots of people in them means that someone comes in and does 
something like the Moscow experience, and the damage it can cause is remarkably fast to a 
lot of people before anyone is able to respond‟ (Front of House Manager). 
 
Informants considered that their main challenge was the sheer volume of events held each year and 
determining the appropriate scale of security. It was reported that unlike the Olympics, hall 
managers had to ensure a constant level of security for over a thousand events a year, held inside 
the centre. This posed dilemmas for management regarding how to operationalize a risk 
management framework on this size and scale. In the end they opted for maintaining business as 
usual: 
„We do random bag checks. We don‟t allow certain things to be taken into the theatre. We‟ve 
already had to substantially increase the security coverage over the last two and a half years 
but the idea of having to search every person coming to over 100 events; you have to make a 
decision. Do I keep the building open in the daytime and allow people to come into the place, 
or, do I actually shut the building down and only open it up for concerts, for people with 
tickets?‟ (General Manager Operations). 
 
Informants argued that a tight security policy would have ultimately deleterious effects on overall 
business performance. 
„The risk there means I can‟t make that viable because I‟ve got businesses, shops, 
restaurants, various other things that sit within it. So there is a risk to return equation that 
you‟re continually having to juggle, which I never even remotely thought about when I 
started in this business and it‟s a huge issue now. But business must come first‟ (CEO).  
 
Table III summarizes both perceptions and actions toward the risk of terrorism in the six 
organizations. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
                                                      TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION  
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The data reveal seven broad themes. The most common (across all six organizations) perceived the 
threat of terrorism as a risk which could be assessed using probability assessments, or variations of 
these using other risk management techniques. These managers assumed that management actions 
would reduce risk by increasing organizational resilience to uncertainty, largely by increasing 
operational excellence. However, deeper investigation revealed that the same organizations also 
exhibit signs of systemic features which were termed by informants ‘grey areas’ of uncertainty.  
These fell outside concerns for operational excellence. Regulation (at airports for example) was 
presumed to cope with uncertainty so managers assumed they need not take action to address these 
risks, whilst other grey areas (such as possible customer profiling) were not implemented at all.   
A further feature of the data reveals what Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985) have termed the 
‘hot hand’ fallacy (in basketball) where individuals might erroneously perceive causal regularity in 
random sequences of events (in the tossing of a coin, for example). Given two sequences of heads 
(H) and tails (T) HHHTTT and HTHTTH, individuals will assume the former sequence is 
significantly more likely to continue HHH than the latter, on the strength of its apparent ‘pattern’ 
when, in fact, both sequences are equally likely (Taleb 2007). As Odean (1998) has also observed, 
the nature of the human mind as a pattern-seeking device can easily lead to spurious causality.  
Examples of this in the data can be seen in the entertainment venue, where it was left to the 
manager of the day to use his or her judgement about the pattern of events (customers, shows, size 
of crowd) to assess risk. The ‘assumption in use’ was that previous experience - nothing had 
happened in the past - was an accurate guide to managing current uncertainties, with the result that 
managers reduce security checks and overall vigilance. These broad patterns draw upon either both 
how managers frame their perceptions and how they deal with uncertainties in practice (what 
decisions they make).  These are examined in more detail below. 
 
Management Framing 
 
Framing refers to definitions of organizational reality which shape both understanding and action 
(Gioia 1986) and includes „assumptions, knowledge and expectations ... expressed through 
language’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994: 176). Framing helps characterize how managers perceive 
uncertainty, which influences action.   
 
The data reveal patterns and regularities in the framing of perceptions.  Such a stance is consistent 
with Giddens’ (1984) notion of ‘bracketing’ whereby some aspects of organization such as security 
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threats or terrorism are perceived to be unproblematic and, hence, are not given priority.  They are 
taken-for-granted patterns in the social structure of organization (Orlikowski 2000) which emerge 
as managers make sense of their context.  Structure and agency are thus intertwined (Reed 1997).  
 
Not all uncertainties concern acts of terrorism, or in trying to predict where terrorists may strike 
next (Mayntz 2004). Economic and operating uncertainties also have to be dealt with and decisions 
made on how to deal with these risks. For example, low-cost airlines allocate very few resources to 
anything other than making a margin on minimum outlay to get a plane full of passengers in the 
sky. Since managers in the airline recognize the importance of terrorism, this is at first sight an 
unusual finding. However, the data indicate that this is a function of assumptions and expectations.   
Managers framed their responses both in terms of assuming airport authorities would do the job of 
customer profiling and security, as well as expecting such processes to take place for every flight. 
Such framing resonates with Cerulo’s (2007) arguments of positive asymmetry and assumptions of 
the normality of distribution and occurrence of events. Airport authorities were assumed always to 
carry out such activities, leaving the low-cost airline to concentrate on operational excellence. 
 
Managers in the arts and entertainment centre assumed that high-risk (cutting-edge) programmes 
were more of a threat than security. As a result, they had cut down security checks in the centre 
and encouraged greater volumes of customers. The use of humour (portraying an earlier IRA threat 
as inept) underscores this framing (Goffman 1974) and corresponds to Gioia’s (1986) notion of 
stories which become institutionalized and which influence what actions managers deem to be 
appropriate. This also resonates with Taleb’s (2007) description of inaccurate perceptions 
concerning organizational histories by managers. 
 
Tour operators argue that people travel without fear since they do not expect any attack to happen 
to them. Tour operator managers also thought this way, and sold their packages to customers on 
the basis that – OK, there is a huge potential for a terrorist strike almost anywhere in the world - 
but that it was not going to happen on this tour. Both customers and managers engage in what 
Bougon et al. (1977) and Eden et al. (1992) term shared cognitive mental maps and engage in 
‘false’ assumptions of normal distributions (Cerulo 2007). Both parties create a series of 
expectations to reduce the apparent/expected threats being faced. These expectations hinge around 
alternative destination choices in the event of a bomb going off (in Madrid, for example). 
Customer and tour operator then construct a frame of reference that ‘assures’ passengers that an 
alternative destination is safe. 
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Management Practices 
 
In all six organizations, managers were aware that a tight security policy could have a deleterious 
effect on overall business performance. There was a trade-off between implementing security and 
making profits. In our sample, the economics of business largely took priority over managing 
security. This was most manifest in either relying on other organizations in the supply chain (for 
example, low-cost airlines assuming airports would conduct all security checks) or in arguing that 
other risks were more important (getting customers through the door was the top priority as in the 
entertainment venues).   
 
 
Low-cost airlines allocate very few resources to anything other than making a margin on minimum 
outlay to get a plane full of passengers in the sky. As one informant from the airport operation 
noted: ‘low cost airlines spend as little as 50p per passenger with regard to their security‟. This 
finding resonates with Tarlow and Santana’s (2002) data, which show the limits of risk perception 
in security professionals and how easily they can be influenced by context. In some situations, 
security professionals will deny any problem exists, or argue that someone else will handle it 
(Tarlow and Santana 2002: 424). 
 
In cases 5 and 6, drama performances are prioritized over security measures in the implementation 
of decisions. The argument from informants is that the nature of the performance put on by 
entertainment centres strongly influences the numbers of patrons. Too many avant-garde or 
unpopular commissions can spell financial disaster for these organizations. This was described as 
the most important risk facing these organizations, even though threats from terrorism were 
acknowledged to be high for these public arenas. A combination of a previously bungled  terrorist 
attack and the assumption that it won’t happen here (because when security was relaxed, nothing 
happened) resonates with the arguments of  Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985), Odean (1998) 
and Cerulo (2007), where assumed patterns and probabilities, accumulated in the past, influence 
current actions. 
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Conclusions  
Framing and practice seem intertwined. Individuals’ perception of their context influences the 
actions they take and avoid (Cerulo 2007). Because managers perceive the threat from terrorism as 
seemingly calculable and largely corresponding to a normal distribution of probability, they 
apparently cluster around the same frameworks for analysis and action, for example assuming 
measurement is possible and that regulation will act as a kind of insurance (Cerulo 2007: 15). The 
data indicate that managers appear to employ methods and assessment tools that treat virtually all 
risks as economic in character. This form of ‘traditional’ risk analysis has been prevalent in the 
management literature for at least four decades (see, for example, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), 
Hespos and Strassmann (1965)).  
 
This reveals a gap in the ability of existing management tools and methodologies to deal with 
current threats facing the six organizations in our sample. Highly uncertain terrorist threats, 
management practice needs to develop different risk assessment techniques and practices that are 
not solely derived from a predictable perspective based on normal distributions and probabilities. 
This is because belief in data which follows a regular pattern (such as the average height of human 
beings, or the non-occurrence of a terrorist attack) is an ingrained part of human cognition. As 
Cerulo (2007: 34) argues, observation of a hundred humans would reveal a good picture of average 
height and even if there were one surprise (large or tall) it would not be consequential on the 
average and, hence, on how average height was reported. In a similar vein, the extreme irregularity 
of terrorist attacks appears to have little influence on the way managers view and implement 
strategies to cope with these extreme uncertainties. Framing and action therefore both appear 
conservative, as they are revealed in the current data. Put another way, consequential events and 
improbability are weighed and balanced significantly in the favour of improbability. 
 
Knowledge and information appear to play an important role in both framing and action. The data 
indicate that levels of risk increase as information becomes either scarce or incomplete. This 
concurs with March’s (1999) emphasis on the role of intelligence in effective decision making. All 
organizations in our sample relied upon information supplied to them by government agencies. 
Such intelligence was valuable, but usually out of date or incomplete.  Decisions are nearly always 
made in the context of incomplete or ambiguous information. Empirically, Hickson et al. (2003) 
and Miller et al. (2004) demonstrate the key role of accurate and complete information in helping 
secure effective implementation. It is arguable that the greater the ambiguity and the 
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incompleteness of information for decision makers dealing with threat, the greater is the exposure 
to (and degrees of) risk. Turner (1976) found this phenomenon also applied to ineffective disaster 
management. Managers in the current study nearly always tried to make incomplete information 
‘complete’. For example, the tour operator managers had two strategies toward incomplete 
information. They either tried to fit information into their business model, ignoring what did not fit 
(they legitimized this behaviour arguing that information had proven inaccurate in the past); or 
they began to frame their own interpretations of incomplete data. For example, warnings from the 
Foreign Office not to travel to certain destinations (such as Egypt) were largely ignored on the 
basis that two strikes in quick succession were extremely unlikely. 
 
Although the sample organizations are in the same broad industry sector, there was little evidence 
of learning, or transfer of knowledge, between organizations in the sector (Legge et al. 2007).  The 
transferred experience of one organization (or a group) in the face of such threats and outcomes 
could be the basis for greater inter-organizational learning.  Even natural exogenous events (such 
as the Asian tsunami in December 2004) have the capacity to be the basis for a significant amount 
of organizational learning (e.g. scalability, prediction, evacuation etc) (Cerulo 2007).  
 
It seems difficult to regulate for threat except at the most basic (predictable) level. Regulation 
means, for example, that organizations have to build high and robust walls around a nuclear power 
station, to satisfy the letter of regulation.  However, managers do not know if terrorists are likely to 
crash an aeroplane, release poison gas or do something as yet unforeseeable. Thus, changes may 
need to be made to the ways in which managers perceive risk (Cerulo 2007). People in 
organizations may need to think about risks in different ways and, certainly, they need to be skilled 
in gathering information which they can comprehend, which they can interpret as being useful to 
analysing and assessing risks which do not conform to the prevailing notion of the normal 
distribution.    
 
In this paper we have taken two constructs (framing and action), since our data were able to speak 
to these themes. There are, of course, many more frames, such as stories, folklore, rituals and 
metaphors which could form the basis of more detailed studies of rare events and how individuals 
interpret and react to them. For example, airlines, tour operators and, by extension, other types of 
organizations are exposed to a hybrid form of risk which includes contagious diseases, terrorism, 
the economic risks of market exposure and the risks associated with incomplete or insufficient 
information. (Beck 1992 and 2000; Luhmann 1993; Perrow 1984; Turner 1978). For all its 
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limitations, this paper has tried to depict how managers perceive and act upon one of these rare 
events – the threat of terrorism. A key overall finding is that none of the six sample organizations 
could be described as high reliability organizations in the sense outlined by Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001). This is primarily because managers try to scale the unscalable (applying techniques of 
prediction and planning to unpredictable events) whilst at the same time relying on a range of 
institutionalized factors (such as what happened in the past driving current actions, or relying on 
other organizations to address risks faced by the focal organization) to inform and justify their 
actions in the face of high uncertainty. This combination of the ‘ludic fallacy’ and institutionalized 
factors could, ultimately, be an even more dangerous phenomenon to organizations than the threat 
of terrorism itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
REFERENCES 
Ball, K., and D. C. Wilson (2000) ‘Power, control and computer-based monitoring: repertoires, 
resistance and subjectivities’.  Organization Studies 21/3: 539-566. 
 
Beck, Ulrich (1992)  Risk society: towards a new modernity. London: Sage. 
 
Beck, Ulrich (2000) Power in the global age. London: Polity Press. 
 
Bentley, Tim, and Stephen J. Page (2001) ‘Scoping the extent of adventure tourism accidents’. 
Annals of Tourism Research 28/3: 705-725. 
 
Bhide, A. and Stevenson, H. (1992). ‘Trust, uncertainty, and profits’. Journal of Socio-Economics, 
21, 91-208. 
 
Bougon, Michel, Karl Wieck, and Din Binkhorst (1977) ‘Cognition in organizations: an analysis of 
the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra’. Administrative Science Quarterly 22/4: 606-639. 
 
Bryan, L. L., and C. Joyce (2005) ‘The 21st century organization’. McKinsey Quarterly 3: 1-6. 
 
Callander, Marie, and Stephen J. Page (2003) ‘Managing risk in adventure tourism operations in 
New Zealand’. Tourism Management 14: 13-23. 
 
Cerulo, Karen A. (2006) Never saw it coming: cultural challenges to envisioning the 
worst. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Cornish, P., (2007) Britain and Security. London: The Smith Institute. 
 
Czinkota, Michael, Gary A. Knight, and Peter W. Liesch (2004) ‘Terrorism and international 
business: conceptual foundations’ in Terrorism and the international business environment: the 
security-business nexus. G. Suder (ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Czinkota, Michael R., Gary A. Knight, Peter W. Liesch, and John Steen (2005) ‘Positioning 
terrorism in management and marketing: research propositions’. Journal of International 
Management 11: 581-604. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J., and W. W. Powell (1983) ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields’. American Sociological Review 48/2: 147-160.  
 
Eden, Colin, Fran Ackermann, and Steve Cropper (1992) ‘The analysis of cause maps’. Journal of 
Management Studies. May, 29/3: 309-325. 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989) ‘Building theories from case study research’. The Academy of 
Management Review Oct 1989 14/4: 532-551. 
 
Faulkner, B. (2001) ‘Towards a framework for tourism disaster management’. Tourism 
Management 22/1: 135-147. 
 
Fiedler, F. E. and Garcia, J.E. (1987). ‘New Approaches to Leadership, Cognitive Resources and 
Organizational Performance’. New York: Wiley. 
 33 
 
Furnham, A. (1992). Personality at Work. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
 
Gephart, Robert P. Jr. (1984) ‘Making sense of organizational succession: an ethnomethodological 
approach’. Administrative Science Quarterly 28: 553-581. 
 
Gephart, Robert P. Jr. (1988) ‘Managing the meaning of a sour gas well blowout: the public 
culture of organizational disaster’. Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly 2: 17-32. 
 
Gephart, Robert P. Jr. (2004) ‘Normal risk’. Organization and Environment 17/1: 20-26. 
 
Gephart, Robert P. Jr., and R. Pitter (1993) ‘The organizational basis of industrial accidents in 
Canada’. Journal of Management Inquiry 2/3: 238-252.  
 
Giddens, Anthony (1998) The politics of risk society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gilovich, T., R. Vallone, and A. Tversky (1985) ‘The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception 
of random sequences’. Cognitive Psychology 17, 295-314. 
Gioia, D., Henry P, and Jr, Sims (1986) ‘Cognition-behaviour connections: attribution and verbal 
behaviour in leader-subordinate interactions’. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes New York. 37, April: 197-230. 
 
Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies 
for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 
 
Goffman, Erving (1974) Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
Greenaway, Rob (1996) ‘Thrilling not killing: managing the risk tourism business’. Management 
May: 46-49. 
Greenwood, R., and C. R. Hinings (1988) ‘Organizational design types, tracks and the dynamics of 
strategic change’. Organization Studies 9/3: 293-316. 
Gummesson, Evert (1991) Qualitative methods in management research. London: Sage. 
 
Hamel, Gary, and Liisa Valikangas (2003) ‘The quest for resilience’. Harvard Business 
Review September: 52–63. 
 
Hedberg, B. (1981) ‘How organizations learn and unlearn’, in Handbook of Organizational Design 
Vol. 1.  P. C. Nystrom and W. H. Starbuck (eds). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hertz, David, and Howard Thomas (1983) Risk analysis and its applications.  New York: Wiley. 
 
Hespos, Richard. F., and Paul A. Strassmann (1965) ‘Stochastic decision trees for the analysis of 
investment decisions’. Management Science 11/10: 244-259. 
 
Hickson, David J., Susan Miller, and David C. Wilson (2003) ‘Planned or prioritized? Two options 
in managing the implementation of strategic decisions’. Journal of Management Studies 40/7: 
1803-1836. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1921) Treatise on probability. London: Macmillan. 
 34 
 
Knight, Frank H. (1921) Risk, uncertainty and profit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Langley, A. (1999) ‘Strategies for theorizing from process data’. Academy of Management Review 
24/4: 691-710. 
 
Laqueur, Walter (1999) The new terrorism: fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. London: 
Phoenix Press. 
 
Legge, K., B. Sullivan-Taylor, and D. C. Wilson (2007) ‘Management learning and the MBA: the 
beast that morphed into a chameleon’. Management Learning 38/4: 440-457. 
 
Luhmann, Niklas (1993) Risk: a sociological theory. Berlin: Aldine de Gruyter. 
March, J. G. (1981) ‘Footnotes to organizational change’. Administrative Science Quarterly 26: 
563-577. 
March, J. G., and J. P. Olsen (1984) ‘The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political 
life’. The American Political Science Review 78/3, Sept: 734-749. 
March, James G., editor (1999) The pursuit of organizational intelligence. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Mayntz, Renate (2004) ‘Organizational forms of terrorism hierarchy, network, or a type of sui 
generis?’ MpifG Discussion Paper. Germany: Max Planck Institute for Societies. 
 
Meyer, Alan D. (1982) ‘Adapting to environmental jolts’. Administrative Science Quarterly 27: 
515-537. 
Meyer, A. D., V. Gaba, and K. A. Colwell (2005) ‘Organizing far from equilibrium: nonlinear 
change in organizational fields’, Organization Science 16/5: 456-473. 
 
Miller, Susan, David C. Wilson and David J. Hickson (2004) ‘Beyond planning: strategies for 
successfully implementing strategic decisions’. Long Range Planning 37: 201-218. 
 
Odean, T. (1998) ‘Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?’. Journal of Finance American 
Finance Association 53/5:1775-1798. 
 
Oliver, C. (1991) ‘Strategic responses to institutional processes’. Academy of Management Review 
16: 145-179. 
 
Omand, D. (2006) ‘In the national interest: organising government for national security’. 
The DEMOS Annual Security Lecture. London: Demos. 
 
Orlikowski, Wanda, and Debra Gash (2000) ‘Using technology and constituting structures: a 
practice lens for studying technology in organizations’. Organization Science 11/4: 404-428. 
 
Paraskevas, A. and B. Arendell (2007). A Strategic Framework for Terrorism Prevention and 
Mitigation in Tourism Destinations. Tourism Management, 28/6: 1560-1573. 
 35 
 
Pentland, B. T. (1999) ‘Building process theory with narrative: from description to explanation’.  
Academy of Management Review 24/4: 711-724. 
 
Perrow, Charles (1984) Normal accidents: living with high risk technologies. New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Perrow, Charles (1999) Normal accidents: living with high risk technologies. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Powell, W. W. and P. J. Dimaggio (1991) The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.  
 
Reed, Mike (1997) ‘In praise of duality and dualism: re-thinking agency and structure in 
organizational studies,’ Organization Studies. 18/1: 21-42. 
 
Roberts, Karlen. (1990) ‘Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organization’. 
Organization Science 1: 160-176. 
 
Scott, W. R. (1987) ‘The adolescence of institutional theory’. Administrative Science Quarterly 
32/4: 493 -515. 
 
Scott, W. R. (1995) Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Starbuck, W., and M. Farjoun, editors (2005) Organization at the limit: NASA and the Columbia 
disaster. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Sullivan-Taylor, B. and D. C. Wilson (2007) ‘Resilience and complacency in the private sector’ in 
Britain and Security. P. Cornish (Ed.). London: The Smith Institute. 
 
Taleb, Nassim (2007) The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random 
House. 
 
Tarlow, Peter E., and Gui. Santana (2002) ‘Providing safety for tourists: a study of a selected 
sample of tourist destinations in the United States and Brazil’. Journal of Travel Research 40/4: 
424-431. 
 
Thompson, James D. (1967) Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Turner, Barry (1976) ‘The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21/3: 378-397. 
 
Turner, Barry (1978) Man-Made Disasters. London: Wykeham. 
 
Van Maanen, John (1983) Qualitative Methodology. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Vaughan, Diane (1990) ‘Autonomy, interdependence and social control: NASA and the space 
shuttle Challenger’. Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 225-257. 
 
 36 
Vaughan, D. (2005) ‘On slippery slopes, repeating negative patterns and learning from mistake’ in 
Organization at the limit: NASA and the Columbia disaster. W. Starbuck, and M. Farjoun (eds). 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Weick, Karl (1979) The social psychology of organizing (2
nd
 Edition). Reading MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
 
Weick, Karl (1995) Sensemaking in organizations. London: Sage. 
 
Weick, Karl E., and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe (2001) Managing the unexpected - assuring high 
performance in an age of complexity. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Wensley, R. (2003) ‘Strategy as intention and anticipation’ in Images of Strategy. S. 
Cummings, and D. C. Wilson (eds). Oxford: Blackwell.    
 37 
 
 
TABLE I:             THE SAMPLE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Company  Type Description Scale of Operations 
1 Supplier to 
the aviation 
sector 
One of the largest UK suppliers of 
retailing and catering services for 
airports and airlines 
200 outlets in 15 
countries and 83 
airports across five 
continents 
2 Low-cost 
airline 
Based at a regional UK airport offering  
no-frills airline and related travel 
services 
9.4 million 
passengers/year 
 3 International 
tour operator 
A market leader in the UK inclusive 
holiday market, operating resorts and 
travel agencies, servicing over 40 
holiday destinations 
 
33 million 
passengers/year 
4 International 
airport 
One of the UK’s fastest growing 
regional airports with in excess of six 
million passengers travelling on 
domestic and international flights. 
3,500 travel 
agencies; 79 tour 
operators in 18 
countries; over 120 
aircraft; 37 incoming 
agencies in 31 
countries; 12 hotel 
brands in 28 
countries with 285 
hotels and around 
163,000 beds; 10 
cruise liners 
5 International 
convention 
centre  
One of Europe’s largest multi-arts and 
conference venues, providing art, music, 
film and theatre 
Europe’s largest 
centre for the arts. 
Concert and dance 
venue, seven shops 
and catering units 
6 International 
arts and  
entertainment 
centre 
An integrated entertainment complex 
providing concerts, dance, performances, 
films, literature, education, and the 
visual arts 
One of the UK’s 
largest centres 
comprising multiple 
stages, arenas and 
screens 
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Table II:     Key Informants 
 
Sample  
Organization 
No. of 
Informants 
Role of Interviewee 
Catering supplier 5 
 
Chief Executive 
MD Retail & Catering, UK & Ireland 
Group Communications Executive 
Operations Director, Heathrow Airport  
Operations Manager 
(Group discussions in addition) 
Airport 5 
 
Managing Director (#1) 
Managing Director (#2) 
Airport Sales and Marketing Manager 
Operations Director  
Security Manager  
(Group discussions in addition)  
Airline 4 Director of Business Development  
Head of Sales and Marketing Europe 
Airport Base Manager 
Director of Safety and Security 
Tour company 5 
 
 
UK Managing Director 
Head of Learning and Development 
Head of Public Relations 
Chief Operating Officer 
Group Customer Insight Manager 
HR Director 
(Group discussions in addition) 
Convention centre 3 Head of Venue Services  
Personnel Director 
Security and Safety Manager   
Operations Manager 
Arts and 
entertainment 
centre 
3 Chief Executive 
Head of Visitor Services 
House Manager 
Operations Manager 
TOTAL 
 
25  
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TABLE III   FRAMING AND MANAGING THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN 
BRITISH TRAVEL AND LEISURE ORGANIZATIONS 
  
Organization Perception of Threat Action Repertoire 
Catering supplier Threat can be measured  
Threat from terrorism is a top priority 
 
Work with other  
organizations in the supply 
chain 
Airport Threat can be measured  
Threat from terrorism is a top priority 
Work with other  
organizations in the supply 
chain 
Airline Threat can be measured 
Operational threats take precedence 
 
Rely on other organizations 
to provide security  
infrastructure 
Tour company Threat can be measured  
Regulation mitigates threat 
 
Rely on regulation and 
information before 
acting 
Convention centre Threat can be measured  
Operational threats take precedence 
 
Business as usual takes 
precedence 
Arts and  
entertainment centre 
Thre Threat can be measured  
Operational risks take precedence 
Business as usual takes 
precedence 
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Appendix A: Examples of Questions and Prompts in Interviews and Group 
Discussions 
 
 
 
INTERVIEWS What do you consider are the biggest risks facing your organization? 
 
 How does the threat of terrorism differ from other risk and uncertainties your 
organization faces? 
 
 How do you define the threat of terrorism? 
 
 
 What degrees of vulnerability to terrorism does your organization face? 
 
 How do your suppliers/partners view the threat of terrorism? 
 
 To what extent are individuals blind to threats from terrorism?  
 
 To what extent are there barriers in your organization which might impede 
communication about possible threats? 
 
 How does your organization operate generally to risks and crisis? 
 
 Is terrorist related risk considered at a strategic level in the organization? 
 
GROUPS What drives/changes strategic priorities in your organization? What ensures 
that security matters are at the top of the strategic agenda in your 
organization? 
 
 Does your organization currently have robust emergency plans in place which 
are known to all staff? 
 
 How do you reassure customers and/or suppliers about your level and extent 
of 
risk management? 
 
 How are resources allocated toward combating terrorism? 
 
Who makes such decisions? 
 
How would you say senior managers balance risk and control? 
 
Since 9/11 have resources dedicated to a possible attack increased? 
 
 
 
